Abstract. In this two-part paper we present paranormal modal logic: a modal logic which is both paraconsistent and paracomplete. Besides using a general framework in which a wide range of logics  including normal modal logics, paranormal modal logics and classical logic  can be defined and proving some key theorems about paranormal modal logic (including that it is inferentially equivalent to classical normal modal logic), we also provide a philosophical justification for the view that paranormal modal logic is a formalization of the notions of skeptical and credulous plausibility.
Introduction
In [6] a paraconsistent and paracomplete logic called paranormal modal logic was presented. The present paper is the second part of a two-part paper intent to further elaborate on several philosophical and technical aspects of paranormal modal logic. Besides giving a philosophical justification to paranormal modal logic as a logic of skeptical and credulous plausibility, we have in the first part of the paper [4] introduced a general framework in which a wide range of logics, including classical logic, traditional (normal) modal logics and the most basic of all paranormal modal logics, propositional system K ? , can be defined.
Our purpose in this second paper is threefold. First we want to show some interesting relations that hold between paranormal modal logic and normal modal logic as well as between paranormal modal logic and classical (nonmodal) logic. For instance, by making use of two specific translation functions we prove that paranormal modal logic is both from a representational as well as from an inferential point of view equivalent to normal modal logic. This is done in the next section. Second, we want to lay down some important theorems about system K ? , including that it is sound and complete. This is done in Section 3. Finally, it is also our purpose to introduce some other paranormal modal systems of interest. For instance, in the same way that the system K can be extended into D, T, B, S4, S5, etc., the most basic paranormal modal logic K ? can be extended into corresponding paranormal modal systems. In Section 4 we perform such a task and introduce propositional paranormal modal systems D ? , T ? , B ? , S4 ? and S5 ? . We also introduce a first order paranormal modal logic and a multimodal logic which combines paranormal and normal modalities. In Section 5 we lay down some concluding remarks.
Paranormal Modal Logic, Normal Modal Logic and Classical Logic
In this section we lay down some interesting facts on the relations that are between paranormal modal logic and classical nonmodal logic on the one hand, and paranormal modal logic and normal modal logic on the other hand.
In the course of laying down definitions and proving theorems in this paper we shall use many of the concepts introduced in [4] . 1 Where there is a need for referring to those definitions we shall prefix the corresponding label given in [4] with "I."; I.4.9 for example means definition 4.9 of [4] . In this and the next sections, we have skipped the proof of those results which can be easily worked out with the help of elementary logical proof techniques. We have also skipped the proofs which follow the same pattern of reasoning introduced in previous proofs.
K ? and Classical Logic
Below we use the notions of a language and of a modal logic basis as in definitions I.3.1 and I.3.11, respectively. Definition 2.1. The trivial modal logic basis ϑ ∅ is the pair ∅, ∅ . Definition 2.2. Let L be a language. The modal language L ∅ based on ϑ ∅ is called the trivial modal language based on L.
Clearly, for any language L, L ∅ = L. Definition 2.3. A trivial frame is a frame F = W, R , where W is a set of worlds with exactly one element. A model M based on some trivial frame F is called a trivial model.
In all following definitions let L be a language and ϑ a modal logic basis of arity n. Definition 2.4. A normal valuation of arity n (or simply an n-normal valuation) in L and ϑ is an n-modal valuation Ψ in L and ϑ which, given an n-model M = W, R 1 , . . . , R n , ν , a world w ∈ W , any two formulas α, β ∈ L ϑ and possibly other parameters, satisfies the following conditions: Definition 2.5. A propositional normal valuation of arity n (or simply a propositional n-normal valuation) in ϑ is a n-normal valuation Ψ in L 2 and ϑ which, given a propositional n-model M = W, R 1 , . . . , R n , ν , a world w ∈ W and any propositional symbol p ∈ P , satisfies the following condition: Ψ M,w (p) = 1 iff ν w (p) = 1 .
A propositional n-normal valuation Ψ in ϑ has as parameters: a propositional n-model M , a world w of M and a formula α of L ϑ .
If ϑ = ϑ ∅ we call the propositional normal valuation in it the trivial propositional valuation and refer to it with the symbol Ψ ∅ . Definition 2.6. The non-positive classical axioms Σ C in L ϑ is the set composed by all formulas of L ϑ falling under one of the following schemas:
P9:
(α → β) → ((α → ¬β) → ¬α) P10:
¬α → (α → β) P11:
α ∨ ¬α Definition 2.7. The trivial propositional modal logic or simply propositional classical logic C is the propositional modal system ϑ ∅ , Ψ ∅ , F ∅ , Σ ∅ , where F ∅ is the class of all trivial frames and
where Σ P contains the axioms given in Definition I.3.22, of positive logic in L ∅ .
Trivially, restricting ⊢ C and C to their two parameters forms (A ⊕ ∅ ⊢ C α and A ⊕ ∅ C α), C is the same as propositional classical logic.
Theorems 2.1 and 2.2, whose proofs have been skipped, say that when we consider only non-modal formulas, paranormal modal logic is indistinguishable from classical logic.
K ? and the normal modal system K
Throughout this subsection let L be any language.
Definition 2.8. We define the notions of ♦-modal logic basis, normal modal logic basis and propositional normal modal language as follows:
and ∈ Θ d . The notation adopted in the operators and ♦ is a pre-fixed one. (ii) We call the ♦-modal logic basis ϑ ♦ = { , ♦}, { } the normal modal logic basis. (iii) We say that the propositional modal language based on L and ϑ ♦ is the propositional normal modal language; it will be referred to by the symbol L ♦ .
Just for the sake of comparison with K ? , we will here use a normal modal logic with ♦ as a primitive symbol, rather than as a derived one obtained from . Definition 2.9. A normal modal valuation in L ♦ is a normal valuation Ψ in L and ϑ ♦ which, given a model M = W, R, ν , a world w ∈ W and any two formulas α, β ∈ L ♦ , satisfies the following conditions:
We call the valuation which satisfies definitions 2.5 and 2.9 the propositional normal modal valuation; it shall be referred to by the symbol Ψ ♦ .
In all following definitions let ϑ be any ♦-modal logic basis.
Definition 2.10. The possibility-necessity axioms Σ NP in L ϑ is the set composed by all formulas of L ϑ falling under the following schema:
Axiom NP is needed because of our decision to take ♦ as a primitive symbol.
point of view the similarities between K ? from K: both K ? 's and K's axiomatic use the axioms of positive logic, a possibility-necessity axiom (K1 of Definition I.4.7), a K-like axiom, modus ponens and necessitation.
The difference is that while K has to add to this list just non-positive classical axioms P9-P11, K ? has to take a restricted version of them along with some additional non-positive classical axioms and the paranormal modal axioms which define the behavior of ¬ in connection with ! and ?.
Lemma 2.1. The following schemas of relations between sets of formulas and formula are valid:
Definition 2.13. Let ϕ be a formula-schema of some propositional language L and let p be an atomic formula of L. We define function ρ as follows:
Definition 2.14. Let A be a set of formula-schemas of some propositional language L. ρ(A) = {ρ(α)|α ∈ A}. Lemma 2.2. If the relation-schema A ⊢ c α is true (where ⊢ c is the relation of deduction of propositional classical logic), then the relationschema ρ(A) ⊢ K ? ρ(α) is also true.
Proof. In order to prove this lemma, we need to show that given a specific axiomatic for classical logic Γ + MP, where Γ is a set of formulaschemas, all formula-schemas of ρ(α), α ∈ Γ, are such that ⊢ K ? ρ(α) is true. Let us consider the axiomatic for classical logic P1-P11+MP. Since the formula-schemas P1-P8 have no occurrence of the negation symbol ¬ and since they are axioms of K ? , we have clearly that ⊢ K ? ρ(P1), . . . , ⊢ K ? ρ(P8) are valid. It rests then to consider schemas P9-P11, that is to say, to show that
In order to prove that, we have just to prove that the following formula-schemas are theorems of
In order to show the derivation of P11 ′ , we need first to prove that the following relations are valid:
and
In classical logic, (α → β) → (¬β → ¬α) is deduced from P1, P2, P9 and MP. Thus, in order to prove (Aux1) we have just to rewrite the derivation of (α → β) → (¬β → ¬α) by replacing P9 by its ∼ version P9', which we have just proved above. Below we show the derivation of (Aux2):
MP 9, 10 ⊣ Definition 2.15. We define the function Φ : L ♦ → L ? as follows:
Proof. In order to prove this theorem we have to show that, for all axiom-schemas α of K, ⊢ K ? Φ(α) is a valid relation-schema. Let us do that by induction on the size of the K-derivation α 1 ,. . . , α n = α we know exists.
Base of induction: derivation of size 1: α 1 = α. In this case, α is an axiom of K. The cases where α is an instance of P1, . . . or P8 are trivial, for Φ(α) will be automatically an axiom of K ? . If α is an instance of P9, P10 or P11, Φ(α) will be an instance of P9', P10' or P11', which, as we have shown in the proof of lemma 2.2, are K ? -theorems. If α is an instance of NP (♦α ↔ ¬ ¬α), Φ(α) will be an instance of
Hypothesis of Induction: Suppose that the K-derivation of α is of size n and that the result holds for derivations of size smaller than n. Let α 1 , . . . , α n−1 , α n = α be the derivation of α. α n 's presence in the derivation may be justified in one of the following ways: (i) α n is an axiom of K; (ii) there are i, j < n such that α i = α j → α n ; and (iii) there is i < n such that α n = α i . We have just considered the first case. About the second, since the derivation of α i and of α j are of sizes smaller than n, by the hypothesis of induction we have that there is a K ? -derivation of both Φ(α i ) = Φ(α j → α n ) = Φ(α j ) → Φ(α n ) and Φ(α j ). Applying modus ponens then, we have that there is a K ? -derivation of Φ(α n ). About the third case, since the derivation of α i is of size smaller than n, by the hypothesis of induction we have that there is a K ? -derivation of Φ(α i ). Applying N ! then, we have that there is a K ? -derivation of
Proof. We first note that regarding Ω the function ℧ is invoked only when negation formulas are considered. Formulas of the form ∼ α are analyzed without the help of function ℧:
Proof. 
Definition 2.17. We define the functions △ and ∇ of the form: L ♦ → L ? as follows:
Definition 2.18. For any A ⊆ L ? and B ⊆ L ♦ we put:
Definitions 2.16 and 2.17 formalize a translation that comes naturally when we look at the semantics of normal and paranormal modal logics. With the help of them, we will be able to lay down important results concerning the normal and paranormal relations of deductibility and logical consequence and, in a more general way, the very expressiveness of both logics.
We have the following lemmas. The proofs have been skipped.
Lemma 2.5. The following schemas of relation between sets of formulas and formula are valid:
The following schemas of relation between sets of formulas and formula are valid:
Proof. We are going to prove this lemma by induction on the size of the K-derivation of α from A and B. Let α 1 , . . . , α n be the K-derivation from A ⊕ B to α. Base of induction: derivation of size 1:
Case 2: α is an axiom of K. In order to deal with this case, we have to analyze the possibility of α's being an instance of each one of K's axiomschemas. For each one of these possibilities, we show that there is a K ? -derivation of △(α), which implies that there exists a K ? -derivation of △(α) from △(A) and △(B) and therefore that △(A) ⊕ △(B) ⊢ K ? △(α). Regarding K's classical axioms, the cases where α is an instance of P1-P8 are trivial, for these axiom-schemas appear in K ? 's axiomatic without any modification. It lacks then to show that if α is an instance of P9, P10, P11, K or NP, then there is a K ? -derivation of △α. For reasons that shall be clear later, we shall show firstly the case where α is either an instance of P10 or an instance of P11.
P10 and P11: In order to prove that there is a K ? -derivation of △α in the cases where α is either an instance of P10 or an instance of P11, we need to consider in the same proof by induction the two mentioned cases. In this circumstance, △α has one of the following forms:
Let α = ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ. In this case we have △α = △(ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) = △ϕ ∨ ¬∇ϕ. We shall do the proof by induction on the size of ϕ 5 . Base of induction: ϕ has size 1. ϕ = p. In this case, △α has one of the following forms:
In the first case, △α is an instance of A2 and, therefore, itself a K ? -derivation of △α. In the second case, △α is an instance of A3 and, therefore, itself a K ? -derivation of △α.
Hypothesis of Induction: Take an arbitrary formula ϕ of size n. Suppose that, for any arbitrary formula φ of size m < n, there is a K ? -derivation of ¬∇φ → (△φ → △β), where β is an arbitrary formula, and a K ? -derivation of △φ∨¬∇φ. We will show that, if this is the case, there is also a K ? -derivation of ¬∇ϕ → (△ϕ → △β) and a K ? -derivation of △ϕ ∨ ¬∇ϕ. Let us first consider all possible forms ϕ may have in the case where α is an instance of P10, and after that all possible forms it may have in the case where α is an instance of P11.
. Since φ's size is smaller than n, by the hypothesis of induction we have that there is a K ? -derivation of ¬∇φ → (△φ → △λ)
. Since φ's and λ's sizes are smaller than n, by the hypothesis of induction there exists a K ? -derivation of ¬∇φ → (△φ → △µ), ¬∇λ → (△λ → △µ) and △φ ∨ ¬∇φ.
Here the proof is almost identical to the one of the case above; just replace in the derivation "P(10) 1, 2" for "P(11) 1, 2" in line 3 and "N2" for "N3" in line 4.
). Since φ's size is smaller than n, by the hypothesis of induction we have that there is a K ? -derivation of △φ ∨ ¬∇φ.
△φ ∨ ¬∇φ
Hyp. Ind.
. Since φ's and λ's sizes are smaller than n, by the hypothesis of induction we have that there exists a K ? -derivation of △φ ∨ ¬∇φ, of △λ ∨ ¬∇λ and of ¬∇φ → (△φ → △µ).
. In order to do prove this case, we shall make use of the result proved above in which for every β ∈ L ♦ there is a K ? -derivation of ¬∇β → (△β → △ϕ), where ϕ ∈ L ♦ is an arbitrary formula. We shall refer to this result as P10 * . Again we shall do the proof by induction on the size of ϕ.
Base of induction: ϕ has size 1.
Hypothesis of Induction: Take an arbitrary formula ϕ of size n. Suppose that, for formulas φ of size m < n, there is a K ? -derivation of (△φ → △λ) → ((△φ → ¬∇λ) → ¬∇φ). Before considering all forms ϕ may have, we will prove the following auxiliary result, which shall be used as an inference rule:
. Since φ's size is smaller than n, by the hypothesis of induction we have that there is a K ? -derivation of (△φ → △β) → ((△φ → ¬∇β) → ¬∇φ).
Here the proof is almost identical to one of the case above; just replace in the derivation "P(17) 2, 4" for "P(21) 2, 4" in line 5, "∼(6)" for "∼(7)" in line 6 and "N2" for "N3" in line 8, along with the corresponding changes.
We have therefore to prove that there exists a K ? -derivation of (△ϕ → △φ)! → (△ϕ! → △φ!). Since (△ϕ → △φ)! → (△ϕ! → △φ!) is an instance of K ? , it itself is the derivation we are looking for.
We therefore have proved that in the case where α is an instance of one of the axioms of K, if
This completes the basis of induction of our proof. Now we will proceed to consider the case where the size of the K-derivation of α from A and B is greater than 1.
Hypothesis of induction:
Let n > 1 be the size of the K-derivation of α from A and B. Suppose that for K-derivations of sizes smaller than n the result holds. That is to say, if A ⊕ B ⊢ K ϕ and the size of the derivation of ϕ from A and B is smaller than n, then △(A) ⊕ △(B) ⊢ K ? △(ϕ). Let α 1 , . . . , α n be the K-derivation of α from A and B. Considering we are dealing with the propositional case, by Definition I.3.23, α n = α should satisfy one of the following conditions:
(i) α n is an axiom of K; (ii) α n is one of the premises (α ∈ A ∪ B); (iii) There are i, j < n, such that α j = α i → α n ; (iv) There is an α i ∈ α 1 , . . . , α n−1 , such that α n = α i , and no element of B appears in the derivation of α i .
We have just considered cases (i) and (ii) when we dealt with derivations of size 1. Let us now consider the two other cases.
Since the sizes of the K-derivations of α i and α j from A and B are smaller than n, by the hypothesis of induction we have that there is a K ? -derivation of △(α i ) from △(A) and △(B) and a K ? -derivation of △(α j ) = △(α i ) → △(α n ) from △(A) and △(B). Therefore, taking these two K ? -derivations together and considering item d) of Definition I.3.23 (MP rule), we conclude that there is a K ? of △(α n ) from △(A) and △(B).
Since no element of B appears in the K-derivation of α i from A and B, we are sure that there is a K-derivation of α i from A and ∅. Since the size of such a derivation is smaller than n, by the hypothesis of induction we have that there is a K ? -derivation of △(α i ) from △(A) and ∅. Given this, and taking this K ? -derivation along with item f) of Definition I.3.23 (rule N), we conclude that that there is a K ? -derivation of △(α n ) = △(α i )! from △(A) and △(B). ⊣ Lemma 2.8. The following schemas of relations between sets of formulas and formula are valid:
Proof. To prove this lemma, we shall follow the same path of the proof of lemma 2.7. If A ⊕ B ⊢ K ? α, then there is a K ? -derivation of α from A and B. We then have to prove that if this is the case, there is Kderivation of Π(α) from Π(A) and Π(B).
Base of induction: derivation of size 1:
To deal with this case, we have to analyze the possibility of α's being an instance of each one of K ? 's axiom-schemas. For each one of these possibilities, we shall show that there is a K-derivation of Π(α), which implies that there exists a K-derivation of Π(α) from Π(A) and Π(B) and therefore that Π(A) ⊕ Π(B) ⊢ K Π(α). The cases where α is instance of one of K ? 's axioms of positive logic, paranormal classical axioms and additional classical axioms are trivial, for these axiom-schemas are valid in K: P1-P8 and A1-A3 belong to the axiomatic of K and N1-N5 are easily derived from them along with MP (in fact, all of them are theorems of classical logic). Below we consider the cases where α is an instance of K1-K5 or K ? and show that, in these cases, there is a K-derivation of Π(α). In order to simplify our exposition, we show that
, it itself is the derivation we are looking for.
, it itself is the K-derivation we are looking for.
is an instance of K, it itself is the K-derivation we are searching for.
We have proved then that, in the case where α is an instance of one of the axioms of
This completes the basis of induction of the proof. Let us examine now the case where the size of the K-derivation of α from A and B is greater than 1.
Hypothesis of induction: Let n > 1 be the size of the K ? -derivation of α from A and B. Suppose that, for K ? -derivations of sizes smaller than n the result holds. That is to say, if A ⊕ B ⊢ K ? ϕ and the size of the derivation of ϕ from A and B is smaller than n, then Π(A) ⊕ Π(B) ⊢ K Π(ϕ). Let {α 1 , . . . , α n } be the K ? -derivation of α from A and B. by Definition I.3.23, α n = α may have been obtained in one of the following ways:
(i) α n is an axiom of K ? ; (ii) α n is one of the premises (α ∈ A ∪ B); (iii) There are i, j < n, such that α j = α i → α n ; (iv) There is i < n such that α n = α i ! and no element of B appears in the derivation of α i .
We have just considered the first two cases when we dealt with derivations of size 1. Let us now consider the two other cases. Case (iii): Proof. We will prove this lemma by induction on the size of α. Base of induction: α = p. In this case the result trivially holds, for
Hypothesis of induction: Let α be an arbitrary formula. Suppose the result holds for all formulas ϕ of size m < n, where n is α's size. We have to prove that, if this is the case, the result also holds for α. This will be done by considering all possible forms α may have. The only situation which poses some difficulty is the case where α = ¬ϕ. For all others, the proof is trivial. α = ¬ϕ. △α = △(¬ϕ) = ¬∇ϕ. We have then to prove that Ψ ♦M,w (¬ϕ) = 1 iff Ω ?M,w (¬∇ϕ) = 1. That will be done by induction on the size of ϕ.
Basis of Induction: ϕ = p. This case is trivial, for ∇p = △p = p. Hypothesis of induction (which, in order to be distinguished from the first hypothesis of induction, will be referred to as the second hypothesis of induction): Suppose that the result holds for formulas of size smaller than ϕ's size. We will show that, if this supposition holds, independently of the form of ϕ, the general result that Ψ ♦M,w (¬ϕ) = 1 iff Ω ?M,w (¬∇ϕ) = 1 also holds. As usual, we will consider all forms ϕ may have. ϕ = φ. ¬∇ϕ = ¬∇ φ = ¬(∇φ?). Ω ?M,w (¬(∇φ?)) = 1 iff ℧ ?M,w (∇φ?) = 0 iff, for at least one w 
The proof of this case is almost identical to the previous one. We have just to change the occurrences of ! by ?, and of by ♦, and where it appears the expression "for at least one" we write "for all". ϕ = ¬φ. ¬∇¬φ = ¬¬△φ.
Since φ's size is smaller than α's, by the (first) hypothesis of induction, we have that Ω ?M,w (△φ) = 1. Therefore, Ω ?M,w (¬¬△φ) = 1. If Ω ?M,w (¬¬△φ) = 1, then we have Ω ?M,w (△φ) = 1. Since φ's size is smaller than α's, by the (first) hypothesis of induction, we have that 
ϕ=φ ∨ λ. The proof of this case is almost identical to the previous one. We have just to replace all occurrences of ∧ by ∨ and the relevant occurrences of "and" by "or". ⊣ Lemma 2.11. Let α ∈ L ? , M be a model and w a world of
Proof. The proof of this lemma is almost identical to lemma 2.10's. All we have to do is to properly erase the occurrences of △ and consider function Π along with Ψ . ⊣ Theorem 2.5. 
Suppose now that A ⊕ B K α; then there is a model M and a world
Proof. The proof of the first equivalence is almost identical to the proof of the first equivalence in theorem 2.5: switch ⊢ K ? and ⊢ K , lemma 2.9 and lemma 2.7 and replace △ for Π. Respectively, the proof of the second equivalence follows the idea of the proof of the second equivalence in theorem 2.5: properly erase the occurrences of △ and consider function Π along with Ψ as well as use lemma 2.11 instead of lemma 2.10. ⊣ Theorems 2.5 and 2.6 show that both from a proof-theoretical and from a semantic point of view, K and K ? are intertranslatable. In other words, while by using function △ we can translate any inferential relation in K into an inferential relation in K ? , using we can translate any inferential relation in K ? into an inferential relation in K. As a consequence of this, we can say normal and paranormal logics can be fully embedded inside each other: with paranormal modal logic at hand we can obtain normal modal logic, and vice versa. The implications of this are obvious. For instance, since formulas resulting from the application of △ can be seen as abbreviations inside L ♦ , it might be said that there is a formal paraconsistent and paracomplete inferential relation (in addition to a conceptual one) based on a true paranormal modality-dependent negation inside normal modal logic. This we think strengths the thesis we have mentioned in Section 1 of [4] about normal modal logic being paranormal. This result make give room for a sort of objection that questions the whole worthiness of our endeavor: if all the expressive and inferential power of paranormal modal logic is already contained in normal modal logic, what is the point of developing and studying it? We may reply by turning the question around. Since, as theorems 2.5 and 2.6 show, all the expressive and inferential power of normal modal logic is contained in paranormal modal logic, why not question instead the supremacy (if we may use this term) of normal modal logic instead? After all, given the equivalence stated above between the two systems, the only real reason for this supremacy is the historical one that one logic was discovered, created, or whatever, before the other. Of course things are not so simple. In fact, the whole situation parallels the possibility of translating S5 into the monadic fragment of classical first-order logic with only one variable, and vice versa.
As far as we are concerned, we prefer to stick to the formal apparatus available to us and think of two different but very strongly connected formal systems; so strongly connected that they might be taken as different aspects of the same thing. A comparison that comes to mind here is with those transformer toys which at one time look like a car and at other time look like a completely different object, such as an airplane. Despite the toy being, at one specific time, from the point of view of the child who plays with it at that time, only a car, all the materials needed for the airplane are already there, inside the car.
Other facts about K ?
In this section we shall lay down some important facts about K ? . More specifically, we shall present and prove K ? 's soundness and completeness, some important logical theorems of K ? as well as some interesting formulas which are not K ? -theorems and K ? 's theorems of deduction.
Theorem 3.1. K ? is sound and complete, i.e., for any A,
Proof. Let us first prove the left-right direction (soundness): for any
by theorem 2.6 we have that (A) ⊕ (B) K (α). By the soundness theorem of normal modal logic K 7 , we have
From that, along with theorem 2.6, we have that
The right-left direction (completeness) is proved through the same reference to normal modal logic K. Suppose that A ⊕ B K ? α; by theorem 2.6 we have that (A) ⊕ (B) K (α). By the completeness theorem of normal modal logic K, we have then that (A) ⊕ (B) K (α). From that, along with theorem 2.6, we have that
For every schema below, there is a formula of L ? falling under it that is not K ? -valid (and consequently not K ? -theorem):
Proof. In order to prove this theorem, it suffices to show an instance of each one of these formula-schemas that is not K ? -valid. (From theorem 3.1 it follows that it is not K ? -theorem.) Having picked such a formula, we need then only to show a model M = W, R, v and a world w ∈ W such that the formula is not Ω ? -satisfied by M at w. For all formulas, there will be two such models: Model 1: w ∈ W such that v w (q) = 1 and there are w ′ , w ′′ ∈ W such that wRw ′ and wRw ′′ such that v w ′ (p) = 1 and v w ′′ (p) = 0; and Model 2: w ∈ W such that v w (q) = 0 and there are w ′ , w ′′ ∈ W such that wRw ′ and wRw ′′ such that v w ′ (p) = 1 and v w ′′ (p) = 0. We then show, for each one of the schemas, the mentioned instance along with the corresponding falsifying model: Model 1 or 2] . ⊣ Theorem 3.2 indicates from a proof-theoretical point of view in which respects paranormal logic differs from classical logic (and consequently from normal modal logic.) Taking the {P1-P8, A1-A3} corresponding axiomatization of classical logic, all the above formula-schemas need one of the axioms A1-A3 to be derived. But since A1-A3 can be used only if certain restrictions are satisfied, none of the above schemas can be unrestrictedly derived. 
While Theorem 3.3 shows that paranormal modal logic behaves like classical logic when only !?-free formulas are taken into account, Theorem 3.4 shows that in fact paranormal modal logic behaves like classical logic when we consider just classical negation ∼. Theorem 3.5. All formulas of L ? falling under one of the following schemas are K ? -valid (and consequently K ? -theorems):
The following schemas of relations between sets of formulas and formula are sound:
Theorems 3.5 and 3.6 show the similarity between ! and ? and normal modal operators and ♦. First, when only positive formula-schemas are considered, every theorem of normal modal logic is also a theorem in paranormal modal logic. (Here we are considering just K ? , but clearly, as it will become evident later, this applies to all extensions of K ? ). Second, when we consider external negation ∼, all theorems of normal modal logic, without exception, are also theorems of paranormal modal logic. The difference between ! and ? and and ♦ will appear only when we consider the paranormal negation ¬.
Theorem 3.7. For every schema below, there is a formula of L ? falling under it that is not K ? -valid (and consequently not a K ? -theorem):
Theorem 3.7 shows the distinguishing features of ! and ? when taken in connection with ¬. It is interesting to note that it is not only ? that disrespects the principle of non-contradiction in its intra-logical form: ! does not satisfy it either; and it is not only ! that disrespects the middle excluded principle: ? does not satisfy it either. This is because the following sorts of formulas are not K ? -theorems:
Definition 3.1. Let L be a language and ϑ a ?-modal logic basis. For any α ∈ L ϑ and n 0 we define the following abbreviation:
, which is the same as Π(A) ⊕ Π(B ∪ ϕ) K Π(α). But then, by theorem 2.6 again, we have that
Theorems 3.8-3.11 lay down the syntactic and semantic forms of both local (theorems 3.8 and 3.10) and global (theorems 3.9 and 3.11) deduction theorems of paranormal modal logic. They are equivalent to deduction theorems of normal modal logic as stated, for example, in [2] .
Other Paranormal Modal Logics
In this section we show how K ? can be extended in such a way as to obtain other paranormal modal logics. In the next subsection we consider how we can do this by adding extra axioms on the axiomatic side or by restricting the class of frames on the semantic side. The procedure is exactly identical to the way we extend K and obtain other normal modal logics. In Subsection 4.2 we proceed to consider first order paranormal modal logic. Since the definition of other first-order systems is identical to the propositional case, we just consider first-order paranormal modal logic K ? . Finally, in Subsection 4.3, we consider multi-modal logics which contain both normal and paranormal modal operators; we call them multi-normal modal logics.
Extensions of K ?
In this subsection we present some of the most important propositional paranormal modal logics. As it shall become clear when we start our exposition, for each normal modal system N there is a corresponding paranormal system N ? . And the way N ? is obtained from K ? is identical to the way N is obtained from K. For instance, in the same way that we obtain T from K by taking into account only reflexive frames on the semantic side, and by adding the following axiom-schema
T:
α → α to K's axiomatic on the axiomatic side, we obtain T ? from K ? by restricting ourselves to reflexive frames and by adding the axiom-schema T ? to K ? 's axiomatic (see Section 1 of [4] ). In this subsection let L be any language and let ϑ be any ?-modal logic basis. Notice that in Definition I.4.9 we put K ? :
in L ϑ is the set composed by all formulas of L ϑ falling under the following schema: 
The System T ? Definition 4.3. The T ? -axioms Σ T ? in L ϑ is the set composed by all formulas of L ϑ falling under the following schema: 
The System S5 ? 
Theorem 4.13. S5 ? is sound and complete. Theorem 4.14. All formulas of L ? falling under one of the following schemas are S5 ? -valid (and consequently S5 ? -theorems):
First-order Paranormal Modal Logic
In this Subsection let F = W, R 1 , . . . , R n be any n-frame and L be any first-order language.
where D is a function which maps each w ∈ W to some non-empty set called the domain of w, V C is a function which assigns to each w ∈ W and c ∈ U C an element of D(w), V F is a function which assigns to each n-ary function symbol f ∈ U F and w ∈ W a function from D(w) n to D(w) and V R is a function which assigns to each n-ary relation symbol r ∈ U R and world w ∈ W a subset of D(w) n .
Definition 4.11. Let M = W, R 1 , . . . , R n , ν be an n-model. We say M is a first-order model of arity n (or simply a first-order n-model) iff ν is a first-order modal interpretation.
In the following definitions let ν = D, V C , V F , V R be any first-order modal interpretation in F , i.e., M = W, R 1 , . . . , R n , ν is a first-order n-model. is the firstorder modal system ϑ ? ,
, where
is the class of all frames and and L are valid. A not-so-straightforward observation is that, both from a proof-theoretical and from a semantic point of view, the differences between K ? and K 1 ? are equivalent to the differences between the propositional and the first-order cases of normal modal logic K. More generally, given a specific propositional paranormal modal logic P ? , the way it is extended into first-order paranormal modal logic P 1 ? is exactly the same as the way propositional normal modal logic P is extended to first-order normal modal logic P 1 . Therefore, given the amount of literature about the connections between (normal) propositional and first-order modal logic, we will proceed without elaborating further on the first-order features of K
1
? . An important issue of first-order modal logic is designation of terms across different worlds. As far as we are concerned, we are considering only monotonic and rigid first-order models. This means first that every individual constant symbol c and function symbol f name the same things no matter what plausible world we are considering, and second that everything that exists in a given world also exists in any world accessible from it. From a proof-theoretical point of view, this is the sort of model we obtain when we extend propositional modal logic into first-order modal logic through the simplest way: by adding axiom Q and generalization rule. In this formulation, even though the converse Barcan formula holds ∀xα → ∀x α the so-called Barcan formula ∀x α → ∀xα does not. However, when we consider logics with symmetric frames such as S5 and B, both Barcan formulas are valid. The justification for choosing this specific way of extending K ? in K 1 ? rests on the same point of the preceding paragraph. Since it is not our purpose to get into firstorder details such as technical and philosophical discussions about the way quantifiers should be treated, for the sake of completeness we have just focused on the simplest way of extending propositional paranormal modal logic into first-order paranormal modal logic.
Multi-normal Modal Logic
What we call multi-normal modal logic is any modal logic which contains both normal and paranormal modalities. It therefore includes modal systems of arity greater than or equal to 2. For the sake of simplicity, we will consider here only the simplest case where there exist two pairs of dual modal operators, one normal and the other paranormal.
In this subsection let L be any language. (iii) We refer to the modal logic language based on L and ϑ ?♦ by L ?♦ .
In multi-normal modal logic, ! and ? are the paranormal modal operators and and ♦ are the normal operators. Therefore, the same negation operator ¬ will behave sometimes as a modality-dependent paranormal negation and sometimes as a (modal) classical one. A model of multi-normal modal logic is then a 2-model M with two accessibility relations where one is used to evaluate ? and !-marked formulas and the other to evaluate and ♦-marked ones. 
NN:
∼ ∼ α ↔ ¬ ¬α NN is needed in multi-normal modal logic in order to set the normal behavior of (and, consequently, of ♦) . Notice that from NN and NP along with P2 we get:
NP~:
♦ α ↔ ∼ ∼ α According to this interpretation of our modal symbols, PPK ? K can be said to be the most basic logic of plausibility and possibility. From it, many logics such as PPB ? S4 and PPS5 ? S5 can be defined. For other multi-normal modal logics, including one which tries to address in full the problem of formalizing the notions of skeptical and credulous plausibility and epistemic certainty (rather than necessity) see [5] , Chapter 6.
Conclusion
In this two-parts paper we have presented paranormal modal logic inside a general framework in which a wide range of logics, including classical logic and traditional normal modal logic, can be defined. By doing that we think we have achieved a couple of goals. First, as a version of LEI, we made explicit the combining aspect of paranormal modal logic as well as to what extent it can be said to depart from traditional modal logic. Second, we were able to show an important relation that exists between these two classes of logics: despite contrary appearances, paranormal modal logic is both from a representational as well as from an inferential point of view equivalent to normal modal logic. This we think throws some light upon the relations that hold between modal logic and paraconsistent and paracomplete logic. Furthermore, we gave a philosophical justification to paranormal modal logic as a logic of skeptical and credulous plausibility; in particular we justified what is surely one of its distinguishing features as well as its most controversial feature: axioms K2 and K3.
